following on a discussion earlier with a friend, we were discussing the two ‘positions’ of the order of things of the syntheses… via secondary source elaborations. We are both reading D/R together, and we each have a different secondary source as a companion. Anyway- Hughes posits that Williams places the third synthesis as prior to the rest, while Hughes claims that sensibility must come first. Reading this post, I’m inclined to agree with the way Williams handles the material. Otherwise, if sensibility does come first, there would inevitably be an originary or pure ‘sense’ as mentioned here, rather than a field of conditions by which we are affected.
Anyway- a very shorthand bookmark for myself to return to this and engage Hughes’s text more in relation to D/R.

Larval Subjects .

I thought some readers of this blog might find this paper of interest. I presented it at the “Experimenting with Intensities” conference at University of Trent back in 2004 (the year Constantin Boundas retired, sadly). I’m not entirely satisfied with the argument today, though I would still contend that the transcendental in Deleuze’s transcendental or superior empiricism lies in a production of sensibility, rather than a mere receptivity. I suppose I shouldn’t post these things on a blog. But why publish anything anymore? Where there are no encounters and where there is no possibility of dialogue save the occasional inquiry I receive in email, what could the possible value of publication be? Perhaps one aim of academic writing today should be the destruction of the privilege surrounding the academic apparatus, its journals, its conferences, its books; all of which produce isolated islands and foster specialization, staving off any encounter…

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2 thoughts on “

  1. and maybe i’m missing everything, but if i understand williams by way of hughes, the former places thought first — before apprehension, imagination, and memory. this sounds an awful lot like an a priori subjectivity to me, and based on what hughes says about husserl developing what kant originally wrote into the idea of passive syntheses, i don’t see any way to understand becoming based on kant 2.0 or williams alleged position. then again, williams is the expert and writing secondary sources, and i’m writing blog posts…

    • It’s not that Williams places thought first, but the third passive synthesis is important, in that first synthesis of sensing relies on representation and placing the object in relation via memory of past experiences. Having an ‘original’ sensation then suggests a mythic past, which is problematic, as each moment in the past has its own set of ‘conditions’ that we can’t access. If the third synthesis offers a way for the past to serve as conditions of the present, this allows for true difference, for each object can keep its status as a unique thing with its internal difference, rather than repetition of the same and difference based on representational aspects. I think the idea of the ‘virtual’ is key; and this orientation opens up ‘becoming’, in that all of the conditions remain present and possible ‘worlds’ richer if it isn’t limited to the ‘quidditas’ of representation.

      Ultimately- I’m interested in having all the texts in the same place to see where the differences/divergences are…

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